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CASENOTES
ANTITRUST LAW-Divestiture Is Not an Available Remedy
in Private Actions Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone &
Electronics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) f
60,291 (9th Cir. April 25, 1975).
Although the federal government may obtain divestiture" as a form of
injunctive relief under section 15 of the Clayton Act, 2 an issue which has
1. Unlike the Justice Department, which may seek divestiture as a form of equitable
relief under section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970), the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Communications Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board are specifically authorized by
section 11(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970), to decree divestiture

within their respective jurisdictions.
"Divestiture" refers to antitrust decrees by which defendants are required to alienate
themselves of specified property, most often stocks. Related terms are "dissolution,"
which refers to any antitrust judgment dissolving an illegal combination, and "divorcement," which refers to the effect of specific divestiture decrees aimed at violations resulting from vertical integration. See Oppenheim, Divestiture as a Remedy Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws: Economic Background, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 120-21
(1950).
Although the terms "divestiture" and "dissolution" are often used interchangeably, see

United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &Co., 366 U.S. 316, 329 n.ll (1960), dissolution should be considered the inclusive term since it refers to any termination of an unlawful combination whether by contract cancellation, injunction or divestiture. In International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(1975 Trade Cas.) 60,291 (9th Cir. April 25, 1975), the Ninth Circuit unequivocally
asserted that dissolution should be considered the inclusive term. Id. at 66,143 n.49.
See note 50 infra. See also Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic
Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951).
2. Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970), states in relevant part:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be the duty of the
several United States attorneys . . . to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition . . . praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.
In addition, the government often obtains divestiture decrees for violations of section
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), which prohibits a corporation from acquiring any stock of another corporation when the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Since section 15 is a reenactment of section 4
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), see H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
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long been unsettled s is whether the same remedy is available to a private
litigant under section 16 of the Act. 4 Recently, in International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this question when it
examined the legislative history of the Clayton Act' and held that divestiture
7
was not an available remedy in section 16 actions.

In 1967, International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) brought an
antitrust action against General Telephone & Electronics Corp. ,ITT alleged
that through numerous corporate acquisitions, General Telephone had become a vertically integrated telephone conglomerate with its telephone
operating companies buying almost all their telecommunications equipment
8
from General Telephone's own manufacturing subsidiaries. The district
court found that General Telephone's vertical integration had violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act 9 and section 7 of the Clayton Act 10 by
21 (1914), it appears that courts have used the same inherent equitable powers under
both Acts to grant government divestiture decrees. In fact, in the first major case in
which the government obtained a divestiture decree for a section 7 violation, United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-30 (1960), the Court relied
on Sherman Act cases to sustain its use.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have established divestiture as the preferred remedy for section 7 violations. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
3. See pp. 174-76 inf ra.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief . . .against threatened loss or damage by a violation of
the antitrust laws . .. when and under the same conditions and principles as
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is
granted by courts of equity ....
60,291 (9th Cir. April 25, 1975). The
5. 5 TRuDE REG. RaP. (1975 Trade Cas.)
Ninth Circuit is the first federal appellate court to rule on the question. The issue has
been considered by a number of district courts and at least one appellate court has commented on it in dicta. See notes 18-45 infra.
6. See Hearings on Trust Legislation Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); notes 52 & 53 infra.
7. 5 TRADE RaG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,141.
8. ITT attacked General Telephone's 1959 acquisitions of the California Water &
Telephone Co., Western Utilities Corp., West Coast Telephone Co., The Southwestern
States Telephone Co., Central Iowa Telephone Co., Hawaiian Telephone Co., Northem Ohio Telephone Co., Leich Electric Co., Automatic Electric Co., and Lenkurt Co.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ...
is declared to be illegal .... "
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) provides in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
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effectively foreclosing potential equipment sales by independent manufacturers such as ITT to General Telephone's operating companies." To counter
the anticompetitive effects of the acquisitions, the district court ordered
General Telephone to divest itself of three manufacturing subsidiaries and
2
eight telephone operating companies.'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the record of hearings on the
Clayton Act before the House Judiciary Committee 18 indicated that Congress did not intend to grant a private litigant the divestiture remedy under
section 16.14 The court also found that the district court, in computing the
market share foreclosed to independent manufacturers by the vertical integration, had erroneously defined the relevant product market by excluding
from it potential telephone equipment purchases of the Bell System and
5
other customers which were not operating companies.'
The district court was directed on remand to redefine the relevant market
and to make new factual findings of illegality for each challenged acquisition.' 6 Although the divestiture remedy would be unavailable, the appellate
court expressed confidence that injunctive relief directed at the anticompetitive purchasing policy rather than its underlying cause would be adequate to
17
prevent the recurrence of any antitrust violations.
I.

LACK OF PERSUASIVE PRECEDENT

A relatively small number of cases have been concerned with whether
divestiture is an available remedy under section 16,18 and little, if any, of
whole or any part of the stock . . . of another corporation . . . where in any

line of commerce . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
11. The district court concluded that in 1969 General Telephone controlled 46 per-

cent of the independent market for telecommunications equipment and that approximately 80 percent of General Telephone's telephone business went to its affiliate manufacturers through a "most restrictive inhouse buying policy." 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1198,
1210 (D. Hawaii 1972).
12. Id. at 1242-43.
13. See Hearings on Trust Legislation, supra note 6.
14. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,141-45.
15. Id. at 66,149-52.

16. Id. at 66,153.
laches defense.

The court was also required to reconsider General Telephone's

See note 60 infra. Various subsidiary issues were involved, including

the applicability of the proviso in section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970),
an ITTI1 claim under the Hawaiian Antitrust Act, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 480-7(a) (1968),
and the propriety of an award of attorney fees. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.)
at 66,136-57.
17. The court suggested injunctive relief requiring "open purchasing" by General Telephone subsidiaries whereby ITT could compete for each proposed sale. 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,144-45.

18. One commentator has suggested that the speculative attraction of the treble dam-

,170
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the scant available precedent could be considered persuasive authority for a
resolution of the issue. Despite their limited number, the precedents can be
distinguished between earlier decisions in which divestiture relief was refused, 19 and later opinions in which a growing judicial willingness to
20
entertain section 16 divestiture actions is demonstrated.
The first judicial opinion on the general issue of the availability of
divestiture under section 16 appeared in Continental Securities Co. v.
Michigan Central Railroad Co.,21 in which the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
since it had never been held that section 16 included the remedy of
dissolution for private plaintiffs, such remedy was available only to the
government. 22 The court's pronouncement on the availability of the divestiture remedy, however, was dicta, since the court held that the plaintiff-stockholder suing in a representative capacity lacked standing to sue. 23
Despite its weak precedential value, Continental Securities was nevertheless cited 15 years later by a federal district court in Westor Theatres, Inc. v.
Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 24 for the proposition that divestiture was
reserved for the government alone, a view in which at least one other district
court has concurred. 25 Unfortunately, neither of the district courts offered
any legal justification for their argument.
In both Westor Theatres and Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co.,26 the
ages provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), has caused plaintiffs to ignore section 16. Peacock, Private Divestiture Suits Under Section 96 of
the Clayton Act, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 54 (1969). With regard to section 7 violations,
only recently has it been held that treble damages are available. See Gottesman v. General Motors, Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp.
72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
19. See Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926)
(dictum), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927); Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F.
Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107
F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953);
Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.J. 1941);
Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 F. 292 (D.N.J. 1918).
20. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(dictum); McKeon Constr. v. McClatchy Newspapers, TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade
Cas.) 73,212 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1969).
21. 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927).
22. Id. at 379.
23. Id. The court held that section 16, which confers standing upon "any person
• . . against threatened loss or damage" did not extend to the plaintiff, who in suing
in a representative capacity as a stockholder, "apprehends no 'threatened loss or damage'
save that which comes through the damage to his corporation." Id.
24. 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 n.7 (D.N.J. 1941).
25. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
26. 250 F. 292 (D.N.J. 1918).
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United States District Court for the District of New Jersey also refused to
entertain section 16 divestiture suits on the ground that section 16 plaintiffs
were only entitled to preventive relief; hence, the courts were powerless to
annul consummated transactions. This argument was made in apparent
deference to Congress' inclusion in section 16 of common law equity
principles 27 which precluded courts from using their injunctive powers to
force affirmative actions, 28 such as the sale of stock. The validity of this
rationale is doubtful: as early as 1897 the Supreme Court sanctioned the use
of mandatory injunctions, 29 and mandatory decrees which compel defendants to continue business relations with plaintiffs when the defendants'
refusals or threatened refusals to deal have constituted violations of the
30
antitrust laws are often granted in section 16 judgments.
In 1957, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 3' justified its refusal to allow a
section 16 divestiture action with a rationale similar to that advanced by the
Westor Theatres and Venner courts. It argued that a consummated stock
transaction could not constitute the threatened loss or damage anticipated by
section 16 since the harm had already been effected.3 2 The invalidity of this
argument is apparent; a subsequent Supreme Court holding requires that the
threatened injury of section 16 need only take the form of a contemporary
27. See note 4 supra.
28. See Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1061-63
(1965).
The article notes that the distinction between mandatory injunctions which
compel affirmative action and prohibitory injunctions which enjoin future acts has been
significant primarily for preliminary injunctions, although the notion that a mandatory
preliminary injunction could not issue was dispelled by American appellate courts at the
turn of the century. The distinction is significant today in that the wording of many
mandatory decrees is couched in negative terms, and many courts require a stronger

showing for mandatory injunctions.
29. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897). The Lennon Court stated:
Perhaps, to a certain extent, the injunction may be termed mandatory ....
But it was clearly not beyond the power of a court of equity, which is not always limited to the restraint of a contemplated or threatened action, but may
even require affirmative action, where the circumstances of the case demand
it.
Id. at 556.
30. See, e.g., Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 724 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Airfix Corp. of America v. Aurora Plastics Corp., 222 F. Supp. 703, 706 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Nev. 1952). In these
cases, a mandatory injunction was achieved through the employment of negative language. For example, in Greenspun, the defendants were enjoined "from continuing to
refrain and continuing to refuse to tender to plaintiff for insertion and publication in
his newspaper . . . advertising . . . ." 105 F. Supp. at 677.
31. 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

32. Id. at 148.
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violation likely to continue or recur,33 and any existing Clayton Act violation
4
would fall into that category.
In light of the inherent weaknesses in these earlier arguments, some
attention must be given to various judicial pronouncements indicating a
traditional reluctance on the part of the judiciary to afford private parties the drastic relief of divestiture.35 The nature of divestiture suggests
reasons for this reluctance. It is a remedy which may engender the disruptive
breakup of an operating business and its unavoidable effect on the company's employees, customers and suppliers. Additionally, it frequently forces
stockholders to sell their shares at a loss. 3 6 Thus, in protecting the interests
of a private plaintiff, a court may adversely affect the economic interests of
unrepresented third parties. Recognition of the sweeping nature of the
37
divestiture remedy also contributed to its limited use in government suits.
33. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Corp., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969). Zenith obtained a section 16 injunction prohibiting the defendant from misusing a patent
and from conspiring to restrict Zenith's foreign trade.
34. The Court stated, while discussing the similar propriety of injunctive relief under
the Sherman Act, in United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952):
All it takes to make the cause of action for relief by injunction is a real threat
of future violation or a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue
or recur. . . . Even where relief is mandatory in form, it is to undo existing
conditions, because otherwise they are likely to continue.
Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., Schrader v. National Screen Serv. Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1955 Trade
Cas. 68,217 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1955), in which the court stated that
it has come to be generally recognized that considerations of policy are against
decreeing divestiture or the complete destruction of a nationwide business at
the suit of an individual in a private action under the antitrust laws, particular [sic] where [the suit] would have a far-reaching and possibly adverse effect
upon interests not proved to have participated.
Id. at 71,009.
36. Various commentators have recommended limited employment of divestiture because of its drastic nature and its potential to harm third parties, and some commentators
also question the ability of the courts to administer the drastic divestiture remedy. See
generally Celler, The Trial Court's Competence to Pass Upon Divestiture Relief, 10
ANTITRUST BULL. 693 (1965); Van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 147 (1950); Comment, Divestiture in Light of the El Paso Experience, 48
TEXAS L. REV. 792 (1970).
37. Although divestiture decrees have been granted regularly in government actions
against section 7 violators since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961), see note 2 supra, the du Pont opinion
cited only two previous decisions in which the Justice Department had been granted such
decrees. Id. at 330 n.13, citing Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. New England Fish Exch., 258 F. 732 (D.
Mass. 1919), modification denied, 292 F. 511 (D. Mass. 1923).
Under the Sherman Act, divestiture, divorcement or dissolution were granted to the
Justice Department only 24 times during the first 65 years of its existence. See ATroR-
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A 1955 Justice Department report concluded that the infrequent employment of divestiture decrees under the Sherman Act resulted from a conscious
policy decision by the courts to limit their use of this drastic remedy.38
Despite earlier judicial disfavor toward divestiture, a number of courts in
recent years have favorably received the argument that section 16 provides
for divestiture. The first decision to recognize the availability of divestiture under section 16 was Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc.,3 9 in which
a federal district court, after noting that there existed no binding precedent
on the question and that the statute itself did not distinguish between types of
injunctive relief, found that there existed no reason for disallowing divestiture actions. 40 Since Ames, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California has similarly suggested that in some actions under
41
section 16 the only appropriate remedy may be divestiture.
Then, in 1972, the detailed analysis of the issue by the district court in
General Telephone was made available. The court noted not only the
weakness of precedent and the similar wording of sections 15 and 16,42 but
also noted its own ability to achieve divestiture indirectly through a "negative
injunction. ''4 3 Since the Supreme Court considered divestiture to be the most
NEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM'N TO STUDY

THE ANTITRUST LAWS, FINAL REPORT

354

(1955).
38.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM'N TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra

note 37, at 353-58. The report noted that courts, as a rule, "have refused divestiture
in the absence of some clear showing of its necessity to insure effective competition,
its practicality and, in light of surrounding circumstances, its basic fairness." Id. at 354.
39. 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
40. Id. at 526.
41. See Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 81-82 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); Burkhead v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120, 126-27 (N.D. Cal.
1970); McKeon Constr. v. McClatchy Newspapers, TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,212 at 88,810, 88,817 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1969). In Burkhead, the court stated:
While divestiture would appear to be appropriate only in a limited number of
cases where no other form of preventative relief would suffice, one such case
where divestiture might be the only adequate and complete remedy would be
where, as here, plaintiff alleges a monopoly in restraint of trade which is injuring the plaintiff.
Id. at 127.
42. See notes 2 & 4 supra.
43. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 351 F. Supp.
1153 (D. Hawaii 1972). The court asserted that the most conservative interpretation of section 16's language allowed it to fashion this "negative injunction." See id. at
1207. While a court can choose to compel affirmative action by wording an injunction
in negative terms, see note 30 supra, the "negative injunction" aims at compelling a defendant to do one thing by enjoining him from doing other things.
For example, the decrees entered in United States v. Reading Co., 183 F. 427 (E.D.
Pa. 1910), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 226 U.S. 324 (1912), modified, 228 U.S. 158
(1912); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1909), modified and
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effective remedy in similar suits brought by the government, 4 4 the district
court found no reason to refrain from granting divestiture directly rather
than engaging in verbal calisthenics to achieve it indirectly. 45 The Ninth
Circuit, however, was to find a rationale.
II.

ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT: A NEW Focus

In its attempt to resolve the divestiture issue, the Ninth Circuit in General
Telephone turned to an examination of section 16's legislative history.46
Unlike the lower court, 47 the circuit court accorded great weight to the
record of hearings on the Clayton Act in determining legislative intent. 48
Although it acknowledged that it was withholding from private parties the
simplest and surest form of relief for section 16 violations, the court held that
the legislative intent expressed in the hearings precluded private divestiture
49
decrees.
affd, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); and Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 120 F. 721 (D. Minn.
1903), aff'd, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), were negative injunctions obtained by a Justice Department still uncertain of its ability to obtain mandatory divestiture decrees. In those
cases, the defendant holding companies were restrained from voting the stock of their
operating companies or exercising any control over them, and the operating companies
were restrained from paying the defendants any dividends. Hence, the defendants could
only recoup their investments by selling their stock. See Peacock, supra note 18, at
73-74.
For examples of the application of negative injunctions in section 16 suits, see American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (defendant enjoined from voting its shares of plaintiff's stock, acquiring a seat on the plaintiff's board of directors and making future acquisitions of such stock); Alden-Rochelle,
Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (court withdrew divestiture order and issued injunction prohibiting the defendant
from collecting royalties on certain motion pictures, an action which rendered worthless
the rights the court had earlier ordered divested).
44. See note 2 supra.
45. 351 F. Supp. at 1208.
46. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,141-44. See Hearings on Trust Legislation, supra note 6.
47. The district court was the first court to look at the record of the hearings in considering the divestiture issue, but it stated that the hearing record and any legislative
material other than committee reports were of little value in ascertaining legislative intent. 351 F. Supp. at 1207 n.150.
60,291, at 66,142. For support of its
48. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.)
use of hearing records, the court cited the following cases in which the Supreme Court
has interpreted legislation by referring to statements made in hearings and floor debates:
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); Woodwork Mfg. v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612 (1967); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270 (1956); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951); EL-ker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
49. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,141-45.
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Numerous colloquies during hearings before the House Judiciary Committee indicated that committee members did not intend that the reference in
section 16 to injunctive relief include the remedy of dissolution. 50 Several
times committee members asked witnesses their views on proposals to
broaden the scope of section 16 relief to include private dissolution suits, '1
and during one exchange with an antitrust attorney who favored these suits ' 2
a committee member remarked that the committee did not intend such a result by section 16.5 Since these colloquies indicate that the committee viewed
dissolution as an equitable remedy distinct from injunctive relief, the court
concluded that the committee would have had to broaden the language of
section 16 to specifically provide for private dissolution suits if it had
intended to allow them. 54 While the court admitted that it was not certain
that the entire Congress shared the intent of the committee members, it
emphasized that the congressional debates did not indicate otherwise. 55
The Ninth Circuit also prohibited the district court from attempting, on
remand, to circumvent congressional intent by achieving divestiture indirectly
through a "negative injunction." 5 6 Instead, it suggested that the placement of
an open purchasing requirement on General Telephone might be appropriate
in combatting the anti-competitive purchasing policy engendered by the
57
vertical combination.
50. Committee members and witnesses used the term dissolution rather than divestiture. See note 1 supra. The Ninth Circuit concluded that if the terms had distinct
meanings, dissolution was the inclusive term and divestiture a subcategory. 5 TRADE
REO. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,143. The court also noted that committee members and witnesses often referred to the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust, which
was in effect a divestiture. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78
(1911).
51. Hearings on Trust Legislation, supra note 6, at 261, 492, 649-50, 1372-73. These
witnesses did not favor affording a private litigant the divestiture remedy.
52. The attorney advocated that section 16 be amended so that an individual could
obtain "injunctive and other equitable relief, including an action for dissolution of the
corporation." Hearings on Trust Legislation, supra note 6, at 843 (remarks of Samuel
Untermeyer).
53. Id. at 842 (remarks of Representative John Floyd). Representative Floyd stated
that "[the committee] did not intend by section [16] to give the individual the same power
to bring a suit to dissolve the corporation that the Government has . . . . We discussed
that very thoroughly among ourselves and we decided that he should not have [itl."

54. 5 TRADE

REG.

REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,142.

55. Id.
56. Id. at 66,144. The court specifically disapproved of the negative injunction decreed in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aII'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958). See note 43 supra.
57. The court noted that this remedy might prove burdensome to the enjoined party,
since it would subject that party to the threat of contempt whenever the prevailing party
failed to make a proposed equipment sale. The court suggested that General Telephone
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By denying to private litigants the remedies of divestiture and the
"negative injunction," the Ninth Circuit may have drastically restricted the
number of effective remedial options available to corporate plaintiffs who,
like ITT, seek relief for their foreclosure from a potential market. s
Although corporate plaintiffs can obtain preliminary injunctions,59 such
relief might not be feasible, particularly if a number of corporate acquisitions
are required to demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of a vertical integration. 60 However, the Ninth Circuit decision leaves these plaintiffs only
burdensome and time-consuming injunctive remedies which require plaintiffs
to initiate contempt proceedings each time a violation of an injunctive order
occurs. 61 As the Supreme Court has noted, such injunctions can hardly be

detailed enough to cover in advance all of the many ways in which a parent
company might exert improper influence over its subsidiaries to the detri62
ment of the plaintiff.
might stipulate divestiture as an available remedy if it thought such a decree to be too
bothersome. 5 TRADE REo. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,145. This injunctive remedy,
then, might have the same effect as the usual negative injunction.
58. Among plaintiffs who might be adversely affected by a withdrawal of the divestiture and negative injunction remedies are corporations or their stockholders who bring
suit under section 16 to attack the partial takeover of their company by a competitor.
If the competitor has already acquired stock in the company or a seat on its board of
directors, divestiture or a negative injunction may be the only effective remedy to protect the interests of the plaintiffs. For a more complete discussion of these section 16
actions, see Peacock, supra note 18, at 66-76.
59. For a discussion of the standards which courts use in determining the propriety
of preliminary injunctions under section 16, see Note, "Preliminary Preliminary" Relief
Against Anticompetitive Mergers, 82 YALE L.J. 155 (1972); Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771

(1965).
60. In the present case, ITT attacked acquisitions made by General Telephone over
a period of 16 years. See note 8 supra. The Ninth Circuit held that the defense
of laches was available to General Telephone and asserted that the four year limitation
on Clayton Act private damage actions was long enough to enable plaintiffs to observe
the effects of possible antitrust violations and to calculate their potential effects. The
court did allow the district court to make exception to the limitation in the traditional
exercise of its equity jurisdiction. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1975 Trade Cas.) at 66,14548.
Significantly, despite the need for a reasonable length of time to observe the possible
legality of a challenged acquisition, even when seeking a preliminary injunction the corporate plaintiff must often demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of a vertical integration. Courts often require proof of an actual violation of section 7 rather than a reasonable probability of being able to prove such a violation at trial before they will issue
a preliminary injunction. See YALE L.J. Note, supra note 59, at 157 n.61.
61. For example, if the district court decided on remand to place an open purchasing
requirement on General Telephone, every time that ITT felt it had unjustifiably been
denied a sale, it would be required to institute proceedings and prove its case.
62. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1960). In
du Pont, the government had alleged that du Pont's ownership of 23 percent of the corn-
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In addition to the interests of corporate plaintiffs, the public interest in
free competition is at stake in private antitrust actions which are designed to
provide deterrence to contemplated antitrust behavior.6 3 The Supreme
Court's view that the public is entitled to the surer, cleaner remedy of
divestiture for section 7 violations, rather than a burdensome injunctive
remedy, 64 is no less applicable to private actions. Thus, when divestiture or
a negative injunction is unavailable, the interest of the public as well as of
the private litigant in these more effective remedies must await prosecution
by the Justice Department, whose limited resources dictate that it only
prosecute selected cases. 65
III.

CONCLUSION

By utilizing the legislative history of section 16, the Ninth Circuit has
advanced a sound argument for withholding the divestiture remedy from
private plaintiffs. The result, however, is not favorable for private antitrust
enforcement. By its own admission, the court has withheld from private plaintiffs the most effective remedy for combatting the potentially monopolistic
abuses spawned by corporate mergers.
If other courts follow the Ninth Circuit's ruling, corporate litigants seeking
relief from their foreclosure by a vertically integrated market may well opt to
sue for the tangible benefits of treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act 66 rather than for the injunctive relief available under section 16.
Although the immediate economic interests of private litigants may somemon voting stock of General Motors led to the insulation from free competition of most
of General Motor's market in automobile finishes and fabrics. The lower court enjoined
du Pont from influencing in any way General Motor's choice of officers and directors
and from entering into any preferential trade relations with General Motors. The Supreme Court found the injunction to be inadequate since it required the initiation of contempt proceedings each time a violation occurred and could not be detailed enough to
cover all the ways improper influence might be manifested. It is important to note that
the Court so concluded even though du Pont had already been divested of its voting
rights, which the General Telephone court has impliedly disallowed by denying the issuance of a "negative injunction."
63. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968),
in which the Court stated that "the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by
insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 139.
64. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331, 334
(1960).
65. See A. NEaL, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THm UNTED STATES OF AMERICA 36566 (1968).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) reads in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .... "
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times be adequately served by a treble damage award, the underlying cause
of the antitrust violations-the vertically integrated corporate structure-would remain, with its continuing ability to harm the public as well as
individual corporations through its restraint on free competition.
Thaddeus P. Mikulski, Jr.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-In Environmental Cases Involving
Scientific Unknowns, Risk-Benefit Analysis, Rather than Traditional Standard of Proof, Will Determine Whether Imminent
Health Hazard Exists. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
In their search for greater efficiency and output, modern industry and
agriculture have employed vast amounts of chemical substances. Often, this
practice has had the secondary effect of causing air, water, or land pollution.
The pollution, in turn, has posed imminent health hazards to man. In light of
these hazards, courts, administrative agencies, and legislative bodies are
requested with increasing frequency to issue bans on the use of offending
substances in the environment. Recently, in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA,' the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit was asked to determine whether the continued use of
substances whose effects on man and the environment had not been scientifically proven should be permitted. The case addressed the validity of an
order issued by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) suspending registration and prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
the pesticides aldrin and dieldrin. 2 Contesting the suspension were Shell
1. 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. 5 ENv. REP. 843 (1974). The Administrator's order permitted the sale and use
of existing stocks of aldrin and dieldrin.
The statute which controls the manufacture and use of "economic poisons," including
pesticides, is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 135-135k (1970), as amended, Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972
(FEPCA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (Supp. 11, 1973). Section 135(a) defines "economic
poison" as:
(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents, nematodes, fungi, weeds, and
other forms of plant or animal life or viruses, except viruses on or in living
man or other animals, which the [Administrator] shall declare to be a pest,
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Chemical Company, the sole domestic manufacturer of the pesticides; Florida Citrus Mutual, an association of citrus growers; and the Secretary of
Agriculture. In addition, the Environmental Defense Fund and the National
Audubon Society attacked EPA's decision to allow continued sale and use of
existing stocks.

In December 1970, the Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA
for immediate suspension of aldrin and dieldrin and the initiation of
cancellation proceedings for all existing registrations. The Administrator
responded on March 18, 1971, by issuing a notice of intent to cancel,8 under
section 6(b) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 'Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA),4 all products containing aldrin or dieldrin. The notice was based
on the finding that a substantial question as to the safety of the chemical
existed. If the Administrator had found that the pesticides constituted an
"imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation," he might have
suspended their registration as well. 5 Instead, he found that on the basis of
the available evidence, the case for suspension was too speculative. 6 Because
and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or desiccant.
Under FIFRA, all economic poisons intended for interstate sale must be registered with
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. An economic poison that
is not registered or whose registration is suspended or cancelled cannot be sold in interstate commerce. 7 U.S.C. § 135a (1970). To register a product, a manufacturer must
submit a full sample, label, and product formula to the Administrator. Other requirements may be added at the Administrator's discretion. Id. § 135b, 7 U.S.C. § 136a
(c)(I) (Supp. III, 1973). A request for registration must be published in the
Federal Register, as must all data relevant to the reasons for approval or denial of a
registration. Id. § 136a(c)(4) (Supp. III, 1973).
3. Environmental Protection Agency, Reasons Underlying the Registration Decisions Concerning Products Containing DDT, 2, 4, 5-T, Aldrin and Dieldrin 18, March

18, 1971.
4. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (Supp. III, 1973) provides in pertinent part:
If it appears to the Administrator that a pesticide or its labeling or other material required to be submitted does not comply with the provisions of this subchapter or, when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment, the Administrator may issue a notice of his intent either(1) to cancel its registration . . . .or
(2) to hold a hearing to determine whether or not its registration should
be canceled ....
5. This action would be taken under 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (Supp. m, 1973),
which provides in pertinent part:
If the Administrator determines that action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation or change in classification proceedings, he may, by order, suspend the registration of the pesticide
immediately.
6. "The substantial question of the safety of these registrations is primarily raised
by theoretical data, while review of the evidence from the ambient environment indicates
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the registrants objected to the proposed cancellation, a scientific advisory
committee was appointed and public hearings commenced. The Environmental Defense Fund then sought judicial review of the Administrator's refusal
to suspend registration of the chemicals. In light of the advisory committee's
report, issued on March 28, 1972, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further EPA consideration. 8 After initial review of the report, the EPA issued an order
affirming its previous decision. 9 Then, more than one and a half years later,
the Administrator issued a notice of intent to suspend and, after public
hearings, suspended the registrations on October 1, 1974.10 Reviewing the
suspensions, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the EPA's final
order was a "rational exercise of discretion .. supported by the reasoning
of the agency, and by substantial evidence in the record.""
I.

THE DETERMINATION OF IMMINENT HEALTH HAZARD

A.

Traditional Proof

In his 1974 Year-End Report, Russell Train, Administrator of the EPA,
pointed to a "profound question" which has remained unanswered in environmental affairs: "whether the full presumption of innocence must be extended
to . . . products and compounds" that have not been affirmatively shown
to be harmless to human life and health. 12 Those wishing to apply the traditional tort liability concept of cause in fact' s to the environmental area would
answer in the affirmative. Under traditional principles, the party bringing
suit against the use of a particular substance must produce factual evidence
to show that the substance is responsible for bringing about a specific
harmful condition.' 4 The party alleging the potential or real harm normally
that such potential hazards are not imminent in light of the present registrations." Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 3, at 19.
7. Aldrin/Dieldrin Advisory Committee, Report to William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (1972). The report explains the legal, scientific, and policy considerations upon which the EPA based its considerations to cancel
or suspend the registrations of the named pesticides. It sets out EPA's statutory mandate,
its method of formulating standards, and presents factual data and other considerations
concerning each pesticide.
8. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA(I), 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9. Cancellation proceedings for the registrations of aldrin and dieldrin were ordered
to begin, but there was no interim suspension of the registrations. 37 Fed. Reg. 26463
(1972).
10. 510 F.2d at 1297.
11. Id.
12. R. Train, Year-End Report to the Members of EPA 14-15, Dec. 31, 1974.
13. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
14. "[W]hen the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the proba-
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has the burden of proof and must not only demonstrate a direct link between
the particular substance and the specific damage, but must also counter
assertions by the alleged polluter that his or her challenged conduct is legally
justifiable. 15
Environmentalists have argued that existing concepts of cause in fact
"place potentially severe constraints on the ability of the legal system to
respond to the need to minimize the risks of future environmental injury."' 1 6
An example is provided by consideration of the prerequisites for procurement of the most effective and frequently requested remedy in the environmental area, the injunction. Traditionally, the certainty of the hazard must
be well proven before a court will issue an injunction; there must be a
showing that the threatened harm is both "immediate" and "practically
certain to occur.' 1 7 Even when a potential health hazard is shown to exist,
courts are reluctant to enjoin an activity when the benefits of prohibition are
speculative.'
The reluctance to enjoin potential health hazards was demonstrated in
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,' 9 in which the United States Court of Appeals
bilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict
for the defendant." Id. at 241.
15. See McCoRmicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVlDENCE § 337 (2d ed. E.
Cleary ed. 1972). See also Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1103, 111314 nn.159-62 (1970), in which the author outlines several legal defenses which have been
used. In Brown v. Allied Steel Products Corp., 273 Ala. 711, 136 So. 2d 923 (1962),
the plaintiff observed the construction of a steel fabricating plant but waited 18
months after it began operating to bring suit to enjoin its operation. The defendant successfully argued that the plaintiff was estopped by laches. The defendant in Kentucky
W. Va. Gas Co. v. Matny, 279 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1955), successfully argued that the
plaintiff could not prevail because the five year statute of limitations had run. Another
theory used by defendants is assumption of the risk. See East St. John's Shingle Co.
v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 246 P.2d 554 (1952), in which the court held that
because the municipal sewage dump predated the plaintiff's arrival, the plaintiff had assumed the risk of any inconvenience he suffered because of the dump.
16. Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 373 (1974).
17. See 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 16 (1945). See also Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 16,
at 374; Note, Imminent IrreparableInjury: A Need for Reform, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
1025, 2030-37 (1973). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-47 (1970), does not modify traditional equity doctrines. Gelpe & Tarlock, supra
note 16, at 374 n.9.
18. See cases cited notes 19 and 23 infra.
19. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). Reserve Mining Co., a jointly owned subsidiary
of Armco Steel Corp. and Republic Steel Corp., mines low grade iron ore taconite and
ships it to a beneficiating plant at Silver Bay, Minnesota, where the taconite is concentrated into iron ore pellets and the residue is flushed into Lake Superior. Approximately
67,000 tons of taconite tailings have been discharged daily into the lake since discharge
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for the Eighth Circuit recognized that Reserve's emission of asbestos-like
fibers into the air and water near Silver Bay, Minnesota "[gave] rise to a
reasonable medical concern for the public health. ' 20 Nevertheless, because
no harm to the public health had been proven, the court concluded that the
danger to health was potential, not imminent or certain. 21 The evidence, the
court maintained, was "insufficient to support the kind of demonstrable
danger to the public health that would justify the immediate closing of
Reserve's operations."'22 Moreover, the Eighth Circuit reiterated the stand it
had taken nine months earlier when, in its first consideration of the case, it
stated that "[a]lthough we are sympathetic to the uncertainties facing the
residents of the North Shore, we are a court of law, governed by rules of
proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof of a demonstrable
operations began in 1955.
Litigation commenced in 1970, when the state of Minnesota attempted to enforce a
stringent effluent standard against Reserve. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972). Prior to 1973, the case focused on water pollution abatement. In 1973, however, the federal government introduced evidence that asbestos-like fibers in the discharges constituted a public health hazard and sued to enjoin Reserve's operations. In April 1974, the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota issued an injunction closing Reserve's Silver Bay
facility. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). Two
months later, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted Reserve a stay of the
injunction pending appeal, on the grounds that no public health hazard had been
proven and, absent such a showing, an injunction would be improper due to the substantial economic harm it would cause. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073
(8th Cir. 1974). The initial stay was issued for a period of 70 days. Subsequently,
Reserve obtained extensions of the stay until March 14, 1975, when the Eighth Circuit
issued its decision. On March 20, 1975, the EPA recommended that the Justice Department not seek Supreme Court review of the Eighth Circuit's decision. 5 ENV. REP. 1867
(1975).
20. 514 F.2d at 520.
21. Id. at 537. The court affirmed the injunction, but directed modification of its
terms: Reserve was to be given "a reasonable opportunity and a reasonable time" to
abate its pollution. Id.
22. Id. at 507. The evidence relied on by the court in reaching its decision included
a series of tissue studies performed on the bodies of recently deceased Duluth residents
who had breathed the air and drunk the water near Silver Bay. No asbestos fibers were
detected in the body tissues. Thus, in spite of the uncontradicted evidence discussed in
the district court opinion which indicated that various diseases associated with asbestos
exposure are not apparent until 20, 30 or 45 years after initial exposure, and that among
industrial workers handling asbestos no effects from asbestos exposure were detected
until after 20 years, the Eighth Circuit found that the results of the tissue studies
indicated that no emergency or imminent hazard existed. United States v. Reserve
Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 40 (1974). The appellate court conceded, however, that
the negative results did not dispose of the broader issue of whether ingestion of fibers
poses some danger to public health justifying abatement on less immediate terms. 514
F.2d at 536.
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hazard to the public health."'28
Many courts demand a similar high standard of proof to be met before
they will act to declare any activity to be an imminent hazard to health. This
high standard developed in the 19th century, at a time when natural
24
resources were abundant, technology simple, and industry undeveloped.
The broad policy of the courts at that time was to encourage industrial
expansion and economic growth. 25 An early example of the courts' encouragement is found in Attorney General v. Corporation of Kingston,2 6 in
which the English township of Kingston was found to be pouring large
quantities of sewage into the River Thames. The court refused to enjoin the
activity, finding that plaintiffs had to "establish the existence of an actual
immediate nuisance," and not "a case of injury a hundred years hence, when
'27
chemical contrivances might have been discovered for preventing the evil."
The risk of future injury to environmental resources was often found to be
outweighed by the benefits of present exploitation, since new technology
23. 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974). In a similar case involving coal fumes,
City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill.
App. 3d 624, 321 N.E.2d 412
(1974), the court found that proof of irreparable injury to health was not established
with enough certainty to warrant issuance of injunctive relief. The city of Chicago filed
a complaint alleging that coal being burned by Commonwealth within one mile of the
city limits emitted sulfur dioxide, smoke, particulate matter, dust, fumes, and other poisonous gases harmful to life and property. Id. at 626, 321 N.E.2d at 414. The city
asked that the burning be enjoined. The trial court denied relief and the appeals court
affirmed. In denying the injunction, the court stated that "we are not unmindful of the
harsh health effects caused by air pollutants as illustrated by the various studies presented by the City at trial." Id. at 632, 321 N.E.2d at 418. However, "the City could
not clearly establish that the Edison plant was the direct cause of harmful pollution in
Chicago .... ." Id. at 633, 321 N.E.2d at 419.
In another case, an injunction was denied because actual and immediate harm from
the blasting and dust pollution of a limestone quarry, though probable and potential,
could not be proven. Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 181 Colo. 309, 509 P.2d 588
(1973).
For cases in which requests for cancellation of a pesticide's registration were denied
because it was correctly labelled, despite the fact that the pesticide was frequently misused and caused much human injury, see Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA, 461 F.2d
293 (7th Cir. 1972), and Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th
Cir. 1972).
24. See Note, supra note 17, at 1025. See also Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 16, at
384; Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248 (1973). The authors point out how the idea of
property underwent a fundamental transformation from a static agrarian conception in
which an owner is entitled to undisturbed enjoyment, to a dynamic view of property
which emphasizes productive use and development.
25. See Note, supra note 17, at 1027.
26. 12 L.T.R.(n.s.) 665 (1865).
27. Id. at 669.
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might be developed in the future to eliminate the problem.2" Thus, a high
standard of proof was developed as part of a social policy consistent with the
priorities and needs of the early 19th century. Because of the difficulty of
meeting the required proof, environmental health hazards often went unabated.
B.

Risk-Benefit Analysis

In view of the difficulty encountered by parties attempting to meet the
high standard of proof, there arose a need in the legal system to find an

alternative way of limiting potential and actual health hazards in the
environment. The situation called for a standard which agencies and courts
could use to limit emissions based on risk of harm rather than proof of

harm. The very concept of harm had to be expanded to include future, as
well as immediate, harm. In addition, a shifting of the burden of proof was
29
required.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

pioneered the use of this approach in environmental cases when it applied a
risk-benefit analysis to the field of pesticide control. In Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,3 0 the Environmental Defense Fund
petitioned the court for a review of an EPA order denying suspension of
DDT during the time needed for cancellation of the product's license.
Immediate suspension of DDT was statutorily permissible 3 1 if the Administrator found the product to constitute an imminent hazard to human health.
The court held that in deciding whether an imminent health hazard exists,
the Administrator must consider not only proven harm, but the "magnitude of
the anticipated harm, and the likelihood that it will occur."'32 Explaining that
28. See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 384. The authors see this as illustrative
of 19th century attitudes toward the relationship between technology and social
welfare.
29. The burden would be shifted to those parties wishing to continue emitting possibly harmful elements from their offices and factories. See Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THF ENVMONMENT (M. Baldwin & J. Page
eds. 1970).
But see Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 16, at 415-16. The authors argue that because
of information not yet proven scientifically, it is impossible for either party to meet a
traditional burden of proof. Therefore, the burden of proof concept is inappropriate for
use in environmental cases involving unknowns. Instead, the burden of persuasion
should be shifted, the authors advise, so that those undertaking an activity would have
to establish, as part of their prima facie case, the lack of risk of injury.
30. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (Supp. III, 1973). For the relevant text of this statute,
see note 5 supra.
32. 439 F.2d at 595.
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harm might be imminent even if its impact were not felt for many years,3 3 the
court indicated that FIFRA "leaves room to balance" the benefits of DDT
against its risks.3 4 Significantly, on the same day that Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus was decided, the District of Columbia Circuit
declared, in Well!ord v. Ruckelshaus,3 5 that FIFRA confers broad discretion
on the Administrator "not merely to find facts, but also to set policy in the
36
public interest."
Later, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (I),"7 the District of
Columbia Circuit was again asked to review a decision by the Administrator
to reject suspension of the registration of a group of pesticides during
cancellation hearings; the pesticides involved were aldrin and dieldrin. The
court upheld EPA's method of reaching a decision by finding the "balance
struck between benefits and dangers to the public health and welfare from the
product's use." 38 Nonetheless, because the EPA had only mentioned aldrin
and dieldrin's major uses and had not discussed the benefits resulting from
39
continued use, the case was remanded for further agency elaboration.
The balancing test for pesticide cancellation orders proposed in Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus and Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA (I) was codified when FIFRA was amended by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 (.FEPCA). 40 Under the original
version of FIFRA, a pesticide manufacturer's only responsibility was to show
that the pesticide label truthfully described the product's capabilities and
included clear directions for use. 41 Under FEPCA, the manufacturer now
33. Id. at 597.

34. Id. at 594. Because the Administrator did not articulate the standards he used
in his refusal to suspend, the case was remanded. On remand, the Administrator again
refused to suspend the chemical, and on appeal, his decision was upheld. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
35. 439 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The case reviewed the Administrator's decision
not to suspend the herbicide 2, 4, 5-T.
36. Id. at 601.
37. 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
38. Id. at 535. Notice was taken of the Administrator's statement that "the concept
of the safety of a product is under evolution and refinement in light of increasing knowledge." Id.
39. The court held that "[tlhe interests at stake here are too important to permit
the decision to be sustained on the basis of speculative inference as to what the Administrator's findings and conclusions might have been regarding benefits." Id. at 539.
40. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (Supp. 1II, 1973). See Comment, The Federal
Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972: A Compromise Approach, 3 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 277, 297 (1973).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 135b(a)(1)-(4) (1970) states in pertinent part:
mhe applicant for registration shall file with the Administrator a statement
including-

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 25:178

must demonstrate that the product can perform its intended functions and
be applied according to the most commonly accepted methods without
causing unreasonable "adverse effects on the environment. '42 This requirement represents a clear statement of congressional intent to shift regulatory
emphasis from mere agricultural effectiveness and product safety to include
a more extensive consideration of the potential health and environmental
effects of pesticide use. 43 Like the risk-benefit approach which the District
of Columbia Circuit employed in limiting chemical emissions, the approach
of FEPCA provided for limitation of the use of pesticides based on risk of
44
harm to the environment.
FIFRA has been construed as placing the "burden of establishing the
safety of a product requisite for compliance with the labeling requirements
• . .at all times on the applicant and registrant. ' 45 This shift of the burden
of proof from the traditional party, the party bringing charges of unsafe
conduct, represents a sensitivity to the necessity of protecting against risks to
public safety when all information as to a pesticide's effects is not known.
Indeed, Judge Leventhal, who wrote the opinion in Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA (H), has pointed to the burden of proof as a concept
46
particularly effective for utilization in this effort.
In the past few years, some decisions and new legislation in environmental
areas other than pesticide control have recognized the importance of protecting against risks to public safety when information about a product's effect
on the environment is not complete. 47 The Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 197248 provide that the maximum daily loads for
certain pollutants be set at a level "with . . . a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between
(3) a complete copy of the labeling accompanying the economic poison and
a statement of all claims to be made for it, including the directions for use.
42. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (Supp. III, 1973). See Comment, supra note
40, at 297.
43. See Comment, supra note 40, at 297. The new statute leaves unclear, however,
how much effect is required before a situation becomes "adverse" and what weight the
varying factors will command in the balancing process.
44. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (Supp. Il,1973).
45. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.EPA(I), 465 F.2d 532 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
46. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974), inwhich the author states:
It is my feeling that the burden of proof concept will be relied on increasingly
by courts which are reluctant, on the one hand to interfere with an
agency's expert manipulations of test data and, on the other, to defer blindly
to whatever methodology an agency puts forth in support of its predictions.

Id. at 536.
47. See notes 49-56 infra.
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. III, 1973).
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effluent limitations and water quality."'49 Similarly, the 1970 Clean Air Act5 °
establishes air quality standards which allow for a margin of safety sufficient
to protect the public health. 5 '
A similar concern for unproven health hazards was displayed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
AMOCO Oil Co. v. EPA. 52 In that case, oil companies sought review of
those EPA regulations which prohibited the use of leaded gasoline in
automobiles fitted with catalytic converter devices and which required widespread retail marketing of at least one grade of unleaded gasoline. 53 The
court rejected the contention that sufficient findings, as required under the
Clean Air Act,5 4 were not made. Distinguishing administrative agency
regulations which turn on factual issues from those which turn on policy, the
court held that it would not require policy decisions to be based on "'findings' of the sort familiar from the world of adjudications." 55 When scientific
unknowns and the risk of health hazard were involved, the court found
that it was not necessary to prove cause or harm in order to regulate a
particular substance. 56
49. Id. Section 1313(d)(1)(C) (Supp. I1, 1973) states in pertinent part:
Each State shall establish for [water] . .. the total maximum daily load,
for those pollutants which the Administrator identifies . . . as suitable for such
calculation. Such load shall be established at a level necessary to implement
the applicable water quality standards with . . . a margin of safety which takes
into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970).
51. Id. Section 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970) indicates that "[niational primary ambient air
quality standards [shall be] based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of
safety [as] are requisite to protect the public health."
52. 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
53. Because auto exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and oxides
of nitrogen may be hazardous to health, the Clean Air Act requires catalytic converters
to be installed on many 1975, and most 1976, cars. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b) (1970).
Lead in gasoline in these cars would render inactive the catalytic converters. 501 F.2d
at 726.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857f-6c(c) (2) to -(2)(B) (1970).
55. 501 F.2d at 741.
56. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit dealt with this problem in an occupational
context in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir.
1974), stating: "Where existing methodology or research in a new area of regulation
is deficient, the agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of available information." Id. at 474-75
n.18. The court concluded that "in addition to the currently unresolved factual issues,
the formulation of standards involves choices that by their nature require basic policy
determinations rather than resolution of factual controversies." Id. at 475.
In another case concerning auto emission standards, International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court reviewed EPA's denial of a request
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II. RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AS A METHOD OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LITIGATION

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (lI)57 represents a victory
within the District of Columbia Circuit for risk-benefit analysis over requirements of traditional proof, a victory due in part to provisions of FIFRA, as
amended, and in part to the interpretation given to the relevant statutory
provisions by a court sympathetic to the balancing approach in environmental matters. 58 FEPCA requires the suspension of the registration of aldrin
and dieldrin if EPA should find that the pesticides present an imminent
hazard to the public during the time required for cancellation.' 9 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (I) determined that an imminent hazard
existed not only under crisis conditions, but when "there is substantial likelihood that serious harm will be experienced during the year or two required in any realistic projection of the administrative process. '60 This
criterion for suspension was imputed from provisions of FIFRA. The
statute confers broad discretion on the Administrator to "find facts and to set
policy in the public interest"; 6 ' places the burden of establishing that a
product is sufficiently safe to comply with the labelling requirements "at all
times on the applicant and registrant";6 2 and defines the scope of judicial
review of EPA orders made after public hearings so that the order of the
Administrator will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence when
considered on the record as a whole.6 8
Having decided that aldrin and dieldrin registrations must be suspended if
by International Harvester and three major auto companies for a one year suspension
of the 1975 emission standards prescribed by the Clean Air Act for light duty vehicles.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(B) (1970). The court noted two principal considerations: the grave economic consequences which would ensue if a suspension were not
granted and the auto companies could not meet the emission standards on time, and the
possibly irretrievable ecological damage which might occur if suspension were granted

and if the Administrator's prediction of feasibility were achievable in 1975. Id. at 633.
The process involved was termed a "balancing of risks." Id. at 641. In this case, the
risk of erroneous denial of suspension was found to outweigh the risks of an erroneous
grant.
57. 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 197.5).
.58. See Leventhal, supra note 46, at 536. Judge Leventhal states that, in the public interest, predictions must be made in environmental cases because more conservative

study might "squander so much time as to generate irreversible damage to the environment." id.
59.

7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (Supp. I1, 1973).

60. 465 F.2d at 540.
61. Id. at 534.
62. Id. at 532.

63. 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
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there existed a substantial likelihood of harm during the cancellation process,
the Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (II) court was confronted with the

crucial question of whether or not a substantial likelihood of harm existed. In
contrast to the suspension hearing, which was limited to consideration of
whether the pesticides presented a cancer hazard to man, 64 the court upheld
the Administrator's finding of imminent hazard on the basis of test results
gleaned from studies on mice and rats. 6 5 Shell attacked this reliance on
grounds that extrapolating results from mice to men was too speculative and
that the data collected from the tests on rats was contradicted by other
scientific evidence. 66
The court responded by performing a classic risk-benefit analysis. Where
the risk involved was so great as to create the strong possibility that the
substance causes cancer, and the registrant had the burden of proving the
safety of his product, the Administrator would not be required to prove facts
that scientists had been unable to prove. 67 The court noted that extrapolation of data from mice to men was sufficient to show substantial likelihood
of harm in light of existing conditions.6 8 Because there was "virtually
universal contamination" of humans by residues of aldrin and dieldrin,
making it impossible to establish an uncontaminated human control group, it
would be equally impossible to obtain meaningful test results on humans.6 9
In addition, the court recognized that there were difficulties in obtaining
scientific proof created by features of environmental conditions such as time
lag, broad spatial effects, and buffering. 70 Ethical considerations, as well,
64. 510 F.2d at 1298.
65. Id. at 1298-99.
66. Brief for Petitioner at 31, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d
1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Shell charged that a finding of "imminent hazard" to man
solely on the response in mouse livers "represents an unexplained and scientifically unwarranted departure from prior administrative practice, both at EPA and at all other
agencies." Id. In addition, Shell stated that although the 1958 Delaney Amendment
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains a provision requiring immediate elimination from the marketplace of food additives found to have caused cancer in a single appropriate test animal, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s)(1), 348(c)(3)(A) (1970), there is no
similar provision in FIFRA. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
67. 510 F.2d at 1298.
68. Id. at 1299.
69. Id.

70. See Gelpe &Tarlock, supra note 16, at 396. One of the most common problems,
time lag, arises when effects are remote in time from their causative agents. A good
example of this was presented in United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11,
40 (D. Minn. 1974), in which it was shown that some diseases caused by exposure to
asbestos do not appear until 40 years after exposure.
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would rule out direct human testing.71 Just as the court in International
Harvester, which had balanced the "costs of a wrong decision . . .against
the gains of a correct one," 72 the court in Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA (II) realized that because of the enormity of the health menace which
would be created if aldrin and dieldrin were carcinogenic, its decision should
73
allow for a margin of safety.
The rat data was held acceptable because three tests were run and at least
six witnesses reviewing the results found either a certainty or a strong
possibility that aldrin and dieldrin had produced cancer in rats. 74 Because
the record contained substantial scientific authority supporting the Administrator,75 the court stated that the rat data was sufficient even if controverted
by respectable scientific authority. In response to Shell's charges of lack of
causal connection between implantation of the pesticides in the soil and ingestion of pesticide residues by humans, the court pointed to evidence which indicated that aldrin and dieldrin in the soil were absorbed by plant roots and
transported to the upper parts of plants which were, in turn, fed to farm
76
animals and consumed by humans.
The court concluded that no benefit outweighed the human health risks
which would result from registered use of aldrin and dieldrin during completion of the cancellation period. 7 7 In arriving at this determination, the court
was clearly acting as a policymaker. 78 Instead of the judicial concern for
economic and industrial growth displayed by 19th century courts 79 and
even many courts today, s0 the District of Columbia Circuit showed concern
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

510 F.2d at 1299.
478 F.2d at 641.
See notes 48-51 supra for statutes which also allow for a margin of safety.
510 F.2d at 1300.
Id. at 1298, citing 465 F.2d at 537.
510 F.2d at 1300-01. The District of Columbia Circuit was not convinced of the

safety of ingestion of aldrin or dieldrin by Shell's contention that in the past, ingestion
of aldrin and dieldrin by humans-whch is declining-has always been at or below the

level which the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization
regard as the amount which can be safely consumed every day over a lifetime. Brief
for Petitioner at 45, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
77. 510 F.2d at 1301.
78. Even if the court had tried to limit itself to a determination of simple cause in
fact, "matters of policy and estimates of factual likelihood become hopelessly intervolved
with each other." Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 72
(1954).
79. See notes 24-27 & accompanying text supra.
80. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). The
court found that in the absence of proof of the existence of imminent or actual harm,
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for preserving human life. Resolving the uncertainties in favor of concern for
possible harm to the environment and public health, and not for immediate
economic advantage, the court rejected the policy considerations of another
era.
11.

CONCLUSION

Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (II) represents a decisive victory
for the use of risk-benefit analysis in environmental cases where the existence of physical phenomena remains unproven. Insistence on traditional
standards of proof has heretofore meant that numerous potential health hazards may be left unchecked by the courts. 8 l The use of risk-benefit analysis
recognizes that it is not in the best interest of the public to demand impossible proofs. In the face of serious probable or potential health hazards to
the public, risk-benefit analysis allows for a margin of safety. Using this
analysis, a court can ban the emission of a substance into the environment
on the evidence of the probability, but not conclusive proof, that the substance
is the cause of a hazard to human health.
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (II) should be a powerful weapon
for those who wish to do battle in the courts in order to protect remaining
natural resources from the effects of industrial and agricultural pollution. By
its solid endorsement of the risk-benefit analysis, the 'United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit may well encourage other courts
to abandon traditional standards of proof in environmental cases. By focusing on policy considerations other than immediate economic advantage, it
may suggest to the courts that there are other factors, in addition to those of
82
an economic nature, which warrant their careful attention.
Judith M. Katz

"a legal standard requiring immediate cessation of industrial operations will cause unnecessary economic loss, including unemployment .....
Id. at 537.
81. See cases cited notes 19 & 23 supra.
82. The reasoning employed in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (II) was closely
followed by the EPA when, on July 30, 1975, Administrator Train announced EPA's
intent to suspend the registrations of the pesticides chlordane and heptachlor. The Administrator chose this procedure rather than cancellation because he felt that the eighteen month period needed for the cancellation procedure was too great in light of the
probability that the two chemicals caused cancer in man. This probability was extrapolated from laboratory tests on mice and rats; the tests on the animals were called "reliable indications" that there is a "human cancer hazard." 6 ENV. REP. 550. See Washington Post, July 31, 1975, at Al, col. 1.

